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This dissertation consists of three studies designed to elucidate the psychological and 
neural mechanisms by which affect influences risk-taking in financial decisions.  The 
mechanisms underlying conscious and unconscious affective processes are investigated 
using multiple methods and approaches from personality and social psychology, 
cognitive psychology, and affective neuroscience.  Results show that affect plays a 
crucial role in financial decisions and that there may be two interactive systems by which 
affect influences decisions.  The unconscious system exerts valence-based effects on 
decisions, responds preferentially to implicit measures and implicitly processed affective 
cues, and is likely mediated predominantly by subcortical brain structures.  The conscious 
system exerts emotion-specific effects on decisions, responds preferentially to explicit 




likely mediated predominantly by cortical brain structures.  Study 1 uses fMRI to 
examine the effects of subliminally and supraliminally presented positive and negative 
affective primes on financial risk-taking and neural markers of anticipatory arousal.  
Results show that happy facial expressions increase financial risk-taking and activation in 
the nucleus accumbens, an effect that was significantly stronger in unconscious than 
conscious conditions.  Study 2 tests valence-based and emotion-specific theories of risk 
by using affective primes of the same valence, fearful and angry faces, presented at 3 
stimulus durations (subliminal, short, long) and examining their effect on financial risk-
taking.  Results show that both fearful and angry faces reduce financial risk-taking after 
short stimulus presentations, but only fearful faces reduce financial risk-taking after long 
stimulus presentations.  Study 3 investigates the role of individual differences in affect on 
financial risk-taking using implicit versus explicit measures of affect.  Individuals high in 
negative affect as measured through two versions of a mood implicit association test 
made more safe bond choices on an investment task whereas explicit measures of  
individual differences in affect had no effect on financial risk-taking.  Taken together, 














Research on judgment and decision making is moving away from the idea that 
most decisions are purely cognitive in nature, involving the rational and deliberate 
calculation of costs and benefits for all potential alternatives.  Recently, the field has seen 
a proliferation of lesion, pharmacological, psychophysiological, and functional 
neuroimaging (fMRI) studies to demonstrate that many decisions, particularly those 
involving a high degree of risk or uncertainty, involve more subtle processes that depend 
upon emotion.  For example, research indicates that anticipated emotions, such as regret, 
play a role in risky decision making (Mellers, Schwarz, Ho, & Ritov, 1999).  Other 
researchers have found that affect can directly influence risk estimates (Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In addition, Finucane and colleagues (2000) 
provide evidence for an affect heuristic, the idea that affect helps individuals to respond 
more efficiently in many decisions, particularly when the decision is complex or 
cognitive resources are limited. 
The interaction between affect and cognition has been prominent in dual-process 
models of information processing, which make distinctions between automatic or affect-
based modes of processing and more controlled, cognition-based modes (Epstein, 1994).  





which they termed “risk-as-analysis” and “risk-as-feelings.”  These two modes of 
processing interact, but respond to different characteristics of a situation with the 
cognitive mode sensitive to outcomes and probabilities and the feelings mode sensitive to 
affective considerations.  This dual-process approach to risky decision making is 
consistent with the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis, which argues that affect influences 
decision making through the interaction with cognition (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
This dissertation seeks to test the dual-process approach to risky decisions by 
investigating how both conscious and unconscious affective processes influence financial 
risk-taking and the neural systems associated with anticipatory affect during choice in 
three papers.  Affect is experimentally manipulated in the first two studies through the 
presentation of subliminal and supraliminal affective primes.  In the third study, affect is 
measured using individual difference measures consisting of implicit methods in addition 
to explicit, self-report measures.  Study 1 uses fMRI in combination with subliminally 
and supraliminally presented happy, angry, and neutral affective primes and a dynamic 
financial investment task.  This chapter is formatted as a brief report for journal 
submission.  Study 1 reviews evidence from the field of neuroeconomics and presents 
three main findings.  First, both conscious and unconscious happy affective primes lead 
to increases in financial risk-taking.  Second, both conscious and unconscious happy 
affective primes lead to increased activation in the nucleus accumbens, a neural marker 
associated with positive anticipatory arousal.  In addition, conscious and unconscious 
angry affective primes lead to greater activation in the insula, a neural marker associated 
with negative anticipatory arousal.  Third, nucleus accumbens activation is stronger after 





Study 2 contrasts valence-based versus emotion-specific approaches using fearful, 
angry, and neutral affective primes presented at three durations:  subliminal (30 msec), 
short (230 msec), and long (1000 msec).  Whereas both fearful and angry affective 
primes reduced financial risk-taking after short stimulus presentations, only fearful 
affective primes reduced financial risk-taking after long stimulus presentations, 
demonstrating that shorter affective cues have a valence-based effect on risk-taking while 
longer cues have an emotion-specific effect.    
Study 3 builds upon the previous two dissertation studies and attempts to replicate 
the affective priming effects seen in Studies 1 and 2 using a larger sample size.  This 
study investigates the role of individual differences in affect on financial risk-taking and 
contrasts the effectiveness of implicit versus explicit measures in assessing the role of 
affect in decision making.  This study replicates the results seen in Study 1:  happy 
affective primes led to increases in financial risk-taking relative to neutral, angry, and 
fearful affective primes.  Furthermore, individuals high in negative affect as measured 
through two versions of a mood implicit association test made more safe bond choices on 
a financial investment task.  Individual differences in positive and negative affect 
measured through commonly used explicit, self-report measures had no effect on 
financial risk-taking.  These findings highlight the potential benefit of adding implicit 
measures to study the mechanisms by which affect influences decision making.   
Taken together, these three studies demonstrate that affect plays an important role 
in influencing financial decisions and neural markers of anticipatory arousal, particularly 
at an unconscious level.  Results imply that individuals may be able to improve the 





learning to manage affective states that lead to errors in investment choices.  Results also 
suggest that unconscious and implicit measures of affect may serve as excellent additions 
to studies that traditionally use explicit, self-report measures of affect, which require 
individuals to describe affective states they may not consciously be aware of or willing to 
report. 
The studies in this dissertation advance a model for affect and decision making 
that brings together research findings employing multiple methods and approaches, 
which illustrate the effects of positive and negative affective primes in increasing and 
decreasing financial risk-taking, respectively.  First, they clarify how affective primes 
influence decision making, specifically financial risk-taking on an investment task.  
Second, they help to better understand how affective primes influence activity in neural 
markers associated with anticipatory arousal.  Third, they illustrate that affective primes 
can influence financial risk-taking even when they are presented unconsciously.  Fourth, 
they demonstrate that shorter affective cues have a valence-based effect on risk-taking 
whereas longer affective cues have an emotion-specific effect on risk-taking.  Fifth, they 
indicate that implicit measures of individual differences in affect are more strongly 
associated with financial risk-taking behavior than explicit measures.   
In addition to illustrating the important role of affect in financial decision making, 
this dissertation examines both conscious and unconscious affective processes measured 
through the experimental manipulation of affect and through implicit and explicit 
individual difference measures of affect to illustrate how affect influences the 
psychological and neural mechanisms involved in financial decision making.  Findings 





influences financial decisions:  an explicit, conscious affective system which can best be 
investigated through mood induction methods and self-report measures of affect and an 
implicit, unconscious affective system which can best be studied through implicit 
measures of affect, such as implicitly processed facial expressions and measures such as 
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THE EMOTIONS OF INVESTMENTS: 




Coauthored with Richard D. Gonzalez, Chandra Sripada, and Oliver C. Schultheiss 
 
 
Economic models have focused on decision making as a cognitive process 
involving the cold, rational calculation of expected utility.  However, humans often make 
irrational decisions in their personal and professional lives – behavior that cannot always 
be explained even by relaxing the rational model to include cognitive biases and 
limitations.  In the last decade, cognitive and affective neuroscience research using lesion 
patients, psychophysiology, and fMRI has demonstrated that decisions involving risk or 
uncertainty utilize subtle, implicit affective processes.  However, the mechanisms by 
which these processes influence decisions remain unclear. 
Research evidence shows that positive affect leads to optimistic risk estimates and 
increased risk-taking, such as purchasing behavior, whereas negative affect promotes 
pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse behavior, such as selling (1-4).  Research has 
identified affect as a likely cause of market price anomalies.  For example, sunshine 
increases positive affect and leads to greater stock index returns whereas cloud cover has 





Research has indicated that basic positive and negative affective reactions may be 
elicited by affective primes (i.e., facial expressions of emotion) even when they are not 
consciously perceived by the observer (6, 7).  Facial expressions of emotion are potent, 
social cues that are processed by core affective neurobiological systems (8, 9). The 
affective reactions elicited by facial expressions of emotion have effects on judgments 
and behavior as well as physiological and neural consequences even when they are 
presented subliminally (6, 7, 10-12).   
Recent evidence from the field of cognitive neuroscience demonstrates the role of 
emotion in decision making (13, 14).   Patients with damage in neural systems subserving 
emotion take risks on gambling and investment tasks even when they result in huge 
losses.  For example, Bechara and colleagues (13) found that patients with ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex lesions were more likely than healthy controls to choose card decks with 
large initial rewards, but greater subsequent losses presumably because they failed to 
generate anticipatory skin conductance responses associated with losses in the 
disadvantageous decks.  Furthermore, Shiv and colleagues (14) found that patients with 
lesions in brain regions subserving emotion were less affected than healthy controls or 
patients with lesions in brain regions unrelated to emotion by how much they won or lost 
on an investment task in previous rounds.  
In the neuroeconomics literature, recent fMRI studies have shown distinct neural 
markers linked to the anticipation of gains and losses (15-20). Specifically, activation of 
the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) has been implicated as a neural marker of positive 
anticipatory arousal and activation of the insula as a neural marker of negative 





nonmonetary rewards, such as erotic images, increases activation in the NAcc (15-18) 
while the insula shows activation during the anticipation of losses and risk-averse choices 
(18-20).   
The insula also shows activation when people crave drugs, empathize with others, 
feel pain, and eat chocolate, for example (21-24).  Converging evidence from disparate 
findings suggests that the insula reads the physiological state of the body and generates 
subjective feelings that keep the body in balance.  Information from the insula is relayed 
to multiple brain regions including those involved in decision making, particularly the 
anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortex.   
The NAcc is considered to be involved with the integration of information related 
to cognitive, sensory, and emotional processing.  Converging evidence from 
electrophysiological, pharmacological, lesion, and functional imaging studies suggests 
that the NAcc mediates functions involved in both reward and aversion (25).  While the 
NAcc has traditionally been linked with reward, research has found that aversion induced 
by a painful stimulus activates the NAcc (26, 27).  Although the NAcc is only one 
component of the reward system, it appears to play a crucial role in hedonic state and 
motivated behavior by evaluating stimulus valence. 
Neuroimaging research further indicates that activation in neural markers of 
anticipatory affect is associated with self-reported measures of positive and negative 
aroused affect (19, 28, 29).  For example, Bjork and colleagues (28) found that activation 
in the NAcc during the anticipation of monetary gains was associated with self-reports of 
excitement about the gain cue.  Similarly, Knutson and colleagues (29) found that NAcc 





affect.  In addition, Paulus and colleagues (19) found that anterior insula activation 
during risky choices was correlated with trait measures of negative affect.   
The current study investigates the influence of conscious versus unconscious 
affective processes on financial risk-taking and anticipatory neural activity in the NAcc 
and insula.  We predict that positive affective primes (i.e., happy faces) will be associated 
with greater financial risk-taking and increased activation of the NAcc, that negative 
affective primes (i.e., angry faces) will be associated with decreases in financial risk-
taking and increased activation of the insula, and that the effect of unconscious affective 
primes on financial risk-taking and neural markers of anticipatory arousal will be as 
strong, if not stronger, than the effects of conscious affective primes.  In contrast to 
previous neuroeconomics studies investigating the role of emotion in decision making, 
the current study directly manipulates affect through subliminally and supraliminally 
presented affective primes (i.e., happy, angry, and neutral faces).   
Method 
Twenty-four undergraduate students aged 18-25 participated in this study, 
including 12 men and 12 women (18 Caucasian, 4 African American, 2 Asian American).  
Participants were excluded from participation if they were left-handed, below the age of 
18, not native English speakers, were pregnant, had any metal in their bodies, had a 
current or past diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder, or were currently using any 
psychoactive medications.  Participants gave informed consent in compliance with the 
Institutional Review Board guidelines at the University of Michigan.  They received $50 






Participants completed a practice version of the experimental task before entering 
the scanner.   Using a mixed block and event-related fMRI design, participants completed 
4 runs of affective priming trials in the following order:  unconscious, conscious, 
unconscious, conscious.  Each run consisted of 8 blocks of 6 trials each for a total of 192 
trials per session.  As shown in Figure 2.1, conscious affective priming trials consisted of 
a 230-ms supraliminal affective prime immediately followed by a 1000-ms investment 
task.  Unconscious affective priming trials consisted of a 30-ms subliminal affective 
prime followed by a 200-ms scrambled face mask, which was immediately followed by a 
1000-ms investment task.    
Sixteen color photographs of faces (8 men, 8 women) were used from the 
NimStim Face Stimulus Set (30).  We used a happy, an angry, and a neutral face 
photograph of each individual in addition to12 trials of an additional control („No Face‟) 
condition consisting of a plain black background. 
After each affective prime, participants completed a modified version of the 
Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (BIAS:  18), which required participants 
to decide among two risky, high-payoff stocks and a safe, low-payoff bond (Figure 2.1).  
We decreased the monetary outcomes of the stock choices and increased the monetary 
outcome of the bond choice in the BIAS task from the original study in order to avoid a 
floor effect of the bond choice as suggested by preliminary data collection.   
Without the participants‟ knowledge, one of the two stocks was randomly 
assigned to be the “good” stock while the other was assigned to be the “bad” stock at the 
beginning of each affective priming block.  For the good stock, participants win $5 with 





the bad stock, participants lose $5 with 50% probability, win $5 with 25% probability, 
and no change with 25% probability.  The bond pays $3 with 100% probability.   
Imaging parameters:   
Images were acquired with a 3T General Electric MRI scanner.  Twenty-nine 
axial slices (4 mm thick) were collected from the mid-pons to the top of the skull.  
Functional scans were acquired with a T2* sensitive gradient echo spiral-in/out pulse 
sequence (TR = 2 s, TE = 40 ms, flip angle = 90°, FOV = 24 cm) to minimize signal 
dropout in subcortical regions of interest (31).     
Data analysis:   
 For the behavioral data, percentages of risky stock choices relative to safe bond 
choices were calculated for the „Happy Face,‟ „Angry Face,‟ and „Neutral Face‟ 
conditions during both „Unconscious‟ and „Conscious‟ conditions.  For the fMRI data, 
participants‟ functional volumes were realigned to the first scan and co-registered to their 
anatomical MRI using statistical parametric mapping software (SPM2; Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, UK).  Default SPM2 
settings were used to warp volumetric MRIs to fit a standardized template and 
normalized parameters were applied to participants‟ co-registered functional images.  
Images were smoothed with a 6 mm kernel.  Contrasts were created between conditions 
of interest (e.g., „Happy Face‟ vs „Neutral Face,‟) during the „Pre-Choice‟ stage of the 
investment task.  Spherical 8 mm diameter VOIs based on MNI coordinates from 
previous studies on risk and decision making generated our a priori ROIs, the NAcc and 








Participants made more risky stock choices after happy than neutral faces during 
conscious trials, t(23) = 2.46, p = .022, and unconscious trials, t(23) = 2.18, p = .040.  
However, participants were not more likely to make more safe bond choices after angry 
than neutral faces, t(23) = -0.56, NS.  The affect × consciousness interaction did not reach 
statistical significance.  The percentage of risky stock choices as a function of affect and 
consciousness is shown in Figure 2.2. 
fMRI data 
NAcc activation was greater during the „Happy Face‟ relative to the „Neutral 
Face‟ contrast (38 voxels in right NAcc, peak at [9 9 -3], p < .01), but was not greater in 
the „Angry Face‟ vs „Neutral Face‟ contrast.   NAcc activation was significantly stronger 
during „Unconscious Happy Face‟ versus „Conscious Happy Face‟ trials (Figure 2.3a, 
right NAcc, peak at [9 7 -9], p < .01).  
Insula activation was greater during the „Angry Face‟ condition relative to the 
„Neutral Face‟ condition (14 voxels in right insula, peak at [36 3 12], p < .01 (Figure 
2.3b), but insula activation was not greater in the „Happy Face‟ vs „Neutral Face‟ 
contrast.  These insula ROI analyses did not differ across „Unconscious Angry‟ and 
„Conscious Angry‟ trials. 
Financial risk-taking was positively correlated (r = .41, p < .05) with NAcc 
activation during „Happy Face‟ vs „Neutral Face‟ trials (Figure 2.4a).  Conversely, 
financial risk-taking was negatively correlated (r = -.38, p < .05) with insula activation 





greater during the „Angry Face‟ vs „Neutral Face‟ contrast.  Our results indicate a double 
dissociation between neural responses in the NAcc and insula in response to „Happy 
Face‟ vs „Angry Face‟ affective primes. 
Discussion 
This study investigated how affect can both consciously and unconsciously 
influence financial investment decisions and neural markers of anticipatory affect.  As 
predicted, participants made riskier investment decisions after happy versus neutral face 
primes in both conscious and unconscious conditions.  They showed more NAcc 
activation after happy versus neutral face primes, an effect that was significantly stronger 
for unconscious versus conscious primes.  Financial risk-taking was positively correlated 
with NAcc activation during happy face trials.  These findings show that positive 
affective cues, even when they are unconscious, can influence financial risk-taking and 
may do so through the nucleus accumbens, a neural marker for positive anticipatory 
affect (15, 16, 18). 
Negative affective primes led to increases in insula activation in both conscious 
and unconscious conditions.  Financial risk-taking was negatively correlated with insula 
activation during negative affective priming trials.  These results suggest that negative 
affective cues may increase activation in the insula, a neural marker associated with 
negative anticipatory affect (18-20).  Contrary to our predictions, negative affective 
primes did not produce changes in risk-taking behavior.   
This study shows that affective cues, even when they are not consciously 
perceived, can influence financial risk-taking and may do so through neural markers of 





markers of anticipatory affect and decisions on investment and gambling tasks in which 
feedback on each trial could guide behavior on the next trial.  However, our study used 
affective cues that had no relation to the earnings on the task, thus could not be used to 
guide future behavior. 
Our findings have broad implications for the use of affective cues in marketing 
and financial arenas.  They may explain why casinos are so effective in getting customers 
to engage in risk-taking behavior.  Our model argues that the positive affective cues (e.g., 
cheap hotel rates, free alcohol and gifts, attractive dancers and staff) abundant in the 
casino environment increase activate the NAcc and increase positive anticipatory affect.  
Conversely, insurance companies use negative affective cues in their commercials (e.g., 
fear-inducing car crashes and funeral scenes).  These ads may be effective in decreasing 
risk-taking behavior by activating the insula and increasing negative anticipatory affect.   
This research implies that individuals can improve the quality of their financial 
decisions by learning to recognize and manage affective states that lead to errors in 
investment choices (e.g., overconfidence after gains, anxiety after losses).  Unconscious 
measures of affect may serve as excellent alternatives or additions to traditional 
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INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF FEARFUL VERSUS ANGRY 
AFFECTIVE PRIMES ON FINANCIAL RISK-TAKING:  EVIDENCE FOR 
VALENCE-BASED EFFECTS AT SHORTER STIMULUS DURATIONS AND 
EMOTION-SPECIFIC EFFECTS AT LONGER STIMULUS DURATIONS 
 
 
Although many prominent researchers have argued that emotions are primarily 
conscious (Clore, 1994; Frijda, 1999), recent evidence demonstrates that affective 
processes can also be unconscious.  Several studies have found evidence that basic 
affective reactions may be elicited by stimuli presented implicitly or outside of conscious 
awareness, such as facial expressions of emotion (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Winkielman, 
Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005a).  Facial expressions of emotion are potent and highly 
familiar social cues that are processed by core affective neurobiological systems (Ekman, 
1984).  The processing of facial expressions of emotion can occur implicitly, such as 
when participants are told to focus on some irrelevant dimension, such as the gender of 
the face (Critchley et al., 2000). 
Several lines of research suggest that subliminally or implicitly presented facial 
expressions elicit affective reactions with judgmental (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
Niedenthal, 1990; Winkielman et al., 2005a), physiological (Rotteveel, de Groot, 





the effects of these facial expressions still occur even when there are no changes in 
subjective feelings, which suggests mediation through direct and automatic processes as 
opposed to judgments based on subjective feelings (Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz,  
1997).  The effects of subliminal affective primes seem to be differentiated based on 
general positive or negative valence rather than emotion specificity (Zajonc, 2000).  For 
example, Winkielman and colleagues (2005b) found that subliminal presentations of 
different negative facial expressions of the same valence (i.e., fearful and angry faces) 
both led to similar decreases in preference ratings and similar physiological responses.   
Current theories of emotion argue that implicitly processed facial expressions of 
emotion should activate a general positive or negative affect system (Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1999; Panksepp, 1998; Zajonc, 2000).  Specifically, positive facial expressions 
of emotion, such as happy faces, should activate the positive affect system while negative 
facial expressions of emotion, such as fearful and angry faces, should activate the 
negative affect system.  On the other hand, differentiated effects of specific positive or 
negative facial expressions should require longer stimulus durations and more cognitive 
processing of the facial expression and context.  Thus, subliminal presentations of 
negative facial expressions should increase risk-avoidant choices while subliminal 
presentations of positive facial expressions should decrease risk-avoidant choices 
regardless of the specific emotion depicted in the facial expression.  On the other hand, 
facial expressions of emotion presented under longer stimulus durations should have an 
emotion-specific effect.     
Previous research has shown that subliminally or implicitly presented facial 





Winkielman et al., 2005a), physiological responses (Rotteveel, de Groot, Geutskens, & 
Phaf, 2001), and neural activation (Whalen et al., 1998).  For example, Niedenthal (1990) 
found that subliminal facial expressions of joy had a positive effect on preference ratings 
for cartoon characters whereas disgust faces had a negative effect.  Similarly, Murphy 
and Zajonc (1993) showed that subliminally presented happy faces increased preferences 
for subsequent Chinese ideographs whereas subliminally presented angry faces decreased 
these preferences.  Furthermore, Winkielman and colleagues (2005a) found that 
subliminally presented happy faces increased the pouring and consumption of a novel 
beverage and the perception of the beverage value whereas subliminally presented angry 
faces had the opposite effect.  Using facial EMG, Rotteveel and colleagues (2001) found 
that subliminally presented angry faces were associated with more frowning to 
ideographs than happy faces.  Furthermore, neuroimaging research has shown that 
subliminally presented fearful faces activate the amygdala even in the absence of explicit 
knowledge that the stimuli were presented (Whalen et al., 1998).  In summary, research 
on the effects of subliminally presented facial expressions of emotion indicates that they 
are capable of eliciting basic affective reactions with judgmental, physiological, and 
neural consequences even when they do not elicit changes in subjective feelings.  
Considerable evidence also shows that positive moods lead to optimistic, risk-
taking behavior whereas negative moods promote pessimistic, risk-avoidant behavior.  
For example, Wright and Bower (1992) found consistent mood effects on subjective 
probability judgments.  After a positive mood induction, participants overestimated the 
likelihood of positive events and underestimated the likelihood of negative effects.  





Similarly, Johnson and Tversky (1983) found that participants who read tragic newspaper 
reports were more likely to give higher estimates of risk for a variety of potential causes 
of death and other undesirable events compared to participants reading happy newspaper 
reports.  Furthermore, Schwarz and Clore (1983) found that participants in a positive 
mood report more happiness and life satisfaction than participants in a negative mood. 
In contrast to a valence-based approach, several research groups have investigated 
the influence of specific emotions on decision making using experimental manipulations 
of affect.  Many studies have focused on fear and anxiety and found that they lead to risk-
avoidant judgments and choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  
For example, Raghunathan and Pham (1999) found that anxious affective mood states led 
to increases in preferences for low-risk, low-reward options in gambling and job-
selection decisions whereas sad affective mood states had the opposite effect.  Similarly, 
Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that fearful people made relatively pessimistic estimates 
about future events and made more risk-avoidant choices.  On the other hand, angry 
people expressed risk assessments more similar to those of happy people in that they 
made optimistic risk assessments and engaged in more risk-taking choices (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001).   
The current study builds upon previous research by investigating valence-based 
and emotion-specific approaches to decision making using facial expressions of emotion 
of the same valence (i.e., fearful and angry faces) presented under three stimulus 
durations:   subliminal (30 msec), short (230 msec), and long (1000 msec).  Prior research 
has either investigated general valence effects or the effects of specific emotions on 





subjective feelings.  In contrast, the current study provides a direct test of valence-based 
versus emotion-specific approaches using two different types of facial expressions of 
emotions of the same valence (i.e., fearful and angry faces) presented both implicitly and 
long enough for conscious awareness and cognitive processing to occur.   
Based on evidence from previous research on facial expressions of emotion, we 
predict that facial expressions will have a valence-based effect on decision making when 
presented implicitly at shorter durations (i.e., 30 msec, 230 msec) whereas facial 
expressions presented at longer durations (i.e., 1000 msec) will have an emotion-specific 
effect on decision making.  Implicitly presented facial expressions of fear and anger will 
activate a general negative affect system, and will thus increase risk-avoidant choices 
relative to neutral facial expressions.  However, facial stimuli presented for longer 
durations will show emotion-specific effects on decision making.  Specifically, fearful 
faces will increase risk-avoidant choices whereas angry faces will have no effect on 
financial risk-taking.  
Method 
Participants:   
Sixty-seven undergraduate students from the Introduction to Psychology subject 
pool at the University of Michigan participated in this study.  Participants provided 
informed consent in compliance with the Institutional Review Board guidelines of the 
University of Michigan.  They received course credit for their participation.   
Procedure:   
Experimental task.  Participants completed a practice version of the experimental 





investment task.   Each participant completed 12 trials of each of the 3 affective prime 
conditions (fearful face, angry face, neutral face) under each of the 3 stimulus duration 
conditions (subliminal, short, long) in counterbalanced order for a total of 108 trials.  
Subliminal affective priming trials consisted of a 30 msec affective prime followed by a 
200 msec scrambled face mask, which was immediately followed by a 1000 msec 
investment task.  Short affective priming trials consisted of a 230 msec affective prime 
immediately followed by a 1000 msec investment task.  Long affective priming trials 
consisted of a 1000 msec affective prime immediately followed by a 1000 msec 
investment task.  
Face stimuli.  We used color photographs of the faces of 12 individuals (6 men, 6 
women) selected from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2002).  We used 
a fearful face, an angry face, and a neutral face photograph of each individual.  
Investment task.  After each affective prime, participants completed a modified 
version of the Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (BIAS:  Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005), a dynamic investment task designed to elicit a range of investment 
behaviors that requires the participant to decide among two risky, high-payoff stocks and 
a safe, low-payoff bond.  We decreased the monetary outcomes of the stock choices and 
increased the monetary outcome of the bond choice in the BIAS task from the original 
study in order to avoid a floor effect of the bond choice as suggested by preliminary data 
collection.   
Similar to the original study, our modified BIAS task consists of 5 stages, each 
lasting 200 ms (See Figure 2.1).  During the first stage, the participant is presented with 





participant decides which investment option they will choose when the word “Choose” 
appears („Choice‟).  Then participants wait for a brief period („Wait‟) and their current 
earnings for that trial are displayed („Outcome‟).  In the final stage, the outcomes of all 
the choices are then displayed („Market‟) followed by a 200 msec fixation cross. 
Without the participants‟ knowledge, one of the two stocks was randomly 
assigned to be the “good” stock while the other stock was assigned to be the “bad” stock 
at the beginning of each affective priming block.  For the good stock, participants win $5 
with 50% probability, lose $5 with 25% probability, and no change with 25% probability.  
For the bad stock, participants lose $5 with 50% probability, win $5 with 25% 
probability, and no change with 25% probability.  The bond pays $3 with 100% 
probability on every trial.   
Participants were told the probabilities of the good stock, the bad stock, and the 
bond before the actual experiment, but they were not told which stock was assigned to be 
good and which stock was assigned to be bad at the beginning of each block or that the 
good stock and the bad stock changed after every block.  They were instructed that the 
goal of the task was to figure out which one of the two stocks was the good stock 
throughout the task so that they could win as much money as possible.  Participants were 
also told that the experiment was divided into 3 sections of about 10 minutes each.   
Data analysis:   
 Percentages of safe bond choices were calculated for the 3 affective priming 
conditions (fearful face, angry face, neutral face) during each of the 3 stimulus duration 







To test our main hypothesis, we calculated the percentage of safe bond choices as 
a function of the preceding affective prime (fearful face, angry face, neutral face) and the 
length of the affective prime presentation (subliminal, short, long).  A 3 × 3 within 
subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for affect, F(2, 132) = 4.06, p < .05, 
and for stimulus duration, F(2, 132) = 16.80, p < .001.  The affective prime × stimulus 
duration interaction was not significant, F(4, 264) = 1.29, p = .275.   
Participants were not more likely to make more safe bond choices after 
subliminally presented fearful faces, [t(66) = 0.81, NS] or angry faces, [t(66) = -0.84, NS] 
relative to neutral faces.  Consistent with valence-based approaches, participants made 
more safe bond choices after both fearful faces [t(66) = 2.19, p = .032] and angry faces 
[t(66) = 2.10, p = .040] relative to neutral faces presented at short stimulus durations.  
Consistent with emotion-specific approaches, participants made more safe bond choices 
after fearful faces [t(66) = 2.05, p = .044], but not after angry faces [t(66) = 0.11, NS] 
relative to neutral faces presented at long stimulus durations.  The percentage of safe 
bond choices as a function of affective priming condition is displayed in Figure 3.1.   
An ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect for stimulus duration.  
Participants were more likely to make more safe bond choices after fearful faces that 
were presented at long [t(66) = 4.61, p < .001] and short [t(66) = 2.21, p = .030] stimulus 
durations relative to subliminal stimulus durations.  Similarly, participants also made 
more safe bond choices after angry faces that were presented at long [t(66) = 3.71, p < 
.001] and short [t(66) = 3.18, p = .002] stimulus durations relative to subliminal stimulus 





long stimulus durations relative to subliminal stimulus durations [t(66) = 2.86, p = .006].  
However, they did not make more safe bond choices after short relative to subliminally 
presented neutral faces [t(66) = 0.82, NS].     
Discussion 
 The current study demonstrates that facial expressions of emotion and the amount 
of time that they are presented can have important effects on risk-avoidant choices in a 
financial investment task.  Under short stimulus durations, both fearful and angry 
affective primes increased risk-avoidant choices, demonstrating a valence-based effect on 
risk-taking.  On the other hand, affective primes presented at longer durations had an 
emotion-specific effect.  Fearful affective primes presented at long stimulus durations 
increased risk-avoidant choices whereas angry affective primes presented at long 
stimulus durations had no effect on financial investment choices. 
 This study extends previous research investigating the role of affect in decision 
making.  Previous studies demonstrated that facial expressions of emotion, even when 
they are not consciously perceived, can have effects on basic preferences and judgments 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Niedenthal, 1990; Winkielman et al., 2005a).  The current 
study further demonstrates that facial expressions of emotion, even when they are 
presented implicitly, can influence more complex decisions, such as choices on a 
financial investment task. 
 The current study also adds to the existing literature by investigating the influence 
of facial expressions of emotion as implicitly and explicitly processed socioemotional 
cues on risk-taking in contrast to previous research that examined the effects of specific 





Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  These studies used experimental manipulations of affect, 
(e.g., reading tragic newspaper reports or emotionally evocative scenarios) designed to 
elicit a more lasting change in subjective feelings.   
The finding that both fearful and angry faces increase risk-avoidant choices under 
short stimulus durations is consistent with the idea that implicitly processed facial 
expressions of emotion should activate general positive or negative affect systems 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; Panksepp, 1998; Zajonc, 2000).  The finding of differential 
effects of fear and anger on risk-taking is consistent with previous studies that have found 
differential effects of specific emotions after a mood induction, such as fear and anger 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001) or anxiety and sadness (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), on 
decision making.   
Our findings regarding the differential effects of facial expressions presented at 
longer stimulus intervals highlight the interplay between affective and cognitive 
processes in decision making.  Facial expressions presented at short stimulus durations 
appear to activate a general positive or negative affect system and mediate risk-taking 
through a direct and automatic process rather than through higher-order cognitive 
processes.  On the other hand, facial expressions presented at long stimulus durations 
may influence risk-taking via higher-order cognitive processes.   
Several underlying mechanisms have been identified for valence-based and 
emotion-specific effects on decision making.  One explanation for the valence-based 
mood effects on judgments is the feeling-as-information model, which argues that 
individuals use feelings as a shortcut to judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 2003).  This model 





individuals are given an alternative attribution for their feelings (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
An alternative explanation for mood congruency effects is priming, which suggests that 
affective states influence judgments by priming related cognitive categories (Forgas, 
1995).   
Other accounts focus on how judgments and decisions are influenced by specific 
emotions, such as appraisal theories (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Appraisal theories of emotion, which argue that different emotions result from unique 
patterns of cognitive assessments or appraisals, provide more specific predictions and 
seem to best explain the differential effects seen in the current study.  An appraisal-
tendency approach would predict that fear and anger would exert differential effects on 
assessments of risk because they differ along the cognitive dimensions of certainty and 
control (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  Whereas anger is defined by a sense of control and 
certainty, fear is characterized by a lack of control and uncertainty.  Thus, the fearful 
faces that were presented at long durations may have led to appraisals of uncertainty and 
a lack of control, which activated pessimistic risk perceptions and resulted in increases in 
safe bond choices on the financial investment task.  Our findings are consistent with 
previous research using experimental manipulations and dispositional measures of affect 
that fearful people make more pessimistic risk estimates and risk-avoidant choices 
whereas angry and happy people make more optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking 
choices presumably because they both share a high certainty appraisal in common 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001).   
In summary, the current study demonstrates that negative facial expressions of 





risk-avoidance increases as the length of the presentation of the negative stimulus 
increases.  The effects of facial expressions of emotion presented at short stimulus 
durations are non-specific and influence investment choices by a relatively direct process 
rather than through higher-order cognitive processes or changes in subjective feelings.  
By contrast, the effects of specific negative facial expressions of emotion (i.e., fearful and 
angry faces) become more differentiated as the presentation of the affective cue is 
lengthened, which suggests that cognitive processes (e.g., appraisals) may be mediating 
the relationship between affect and decision making when there is more time to process 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN AFFECT AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS:  
AN INVESTIGATION OF IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT MEASURES OF 




Traditionally, the dominant method of measuring affect in psychological research 
has been through the use of explicit, self-report measures.  More recently, implicit and 
unconscious measures have been developed to assess emotions that respondents may not 
be consciously aware of or able to report.  For example, prior research using subliminal 
affective primes, which was discussed in the previous chapter, suggests that they have 
powerful influences on judgments, decisions, and behaviors.  Furthermore, these effects 
may even be stronger in unconscious than fully conscious conditions (Critchley et al., 
2000; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel, de Groot, Geutskens, & Phaf, 2001; Whalen et 
al., 1998).  
For example, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) exposed participants to subliminally and 
supraliminally presented happy and angry facial expressions of emotion and found that 
the valence of the facial expressions only influenced judgments of novel stimuli during 
subliminal, but not supraliminal, presentations.  Rotteveel and colleagues (2001) found 
further evidence for stronger affective priming in suboptimal than optimal conditions in 
that only subliminally presented angry faces resulted in more frowning behavior to 





fearful faces activate the amygdala and limbic structures without explicit knowledge that 
the stimuli were presented (Whalen et al., 1998).  Furthermore, Critchley and colleagues 
(2000) found that consciously presented facial expressions activate these structures more 
under implicit processing conditions (when participants are asked to classify the faces 
based on gender) rather than under explicit processing conditions (when participants are 
asked to classify the faces based on facial expression). 
Models of economic decision making have focused on explaining aggregate 
behavior even though there is considerable variability in these responses.  Relatively little 
attention has been paid to how individual differences can mediate decision making.  
Given the crucial role that affect plays in decision making, surprisingly few studies have 
investigated the role of individual differences in affect on decision making.  
Understanding the relationship between individual differences in transient and more 
chronic levels of affect and risk-taking behavior would aid in understanding the 
psychological mechanisms behind decision making. 
Research suggests that there are large and stable individual differences in risk 
preferences that emerge in early childhood (Levin & Hart, 2003).  There is also evidence 
that decision making can be strongly influenced by individual differences in affective 
processing and the tendency to experience particular emotions.  For example, Lerner and 
Keltner (2001) found that individual differences in the tendency to experience specific 
emotions influenced cognitive processes associated with decision making.  Emotions 
signal the presence of potential rewards or threats, which promote cognitive processes 





Emotions such as fear promote risk-avoidant behavior whereas emotions such as anger 
increase risk-taking behavior (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). 
Several studies have found associations between dispositional measures of 
anxiety, which is characterized by a heightened sensitivity to the presence of threat and 
negative outcomes, and risk-avoidant appraisals (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) and decisions 
(Maner et al., 2007).  However, it is unclear whether this association is due to the 
presence of negative affect in general or is specifically due to anxiety.  The findings from 
Study 2 of this dissertation strongly suggest that there may be differential effects on 
decision making based on the specific type of emotion rather than a general valence 
effect.   
The current study builds upon the previous two dissertation studies by 
investigating how individual differences in affect influence financial risk-taking and also 
attempts to replicate our affective priming effects using a larger sample size.  We used 
facial expressions of emotion (i.e., fearful faces, angry faces, happy faces, neutral faces) 
presented under three stimulus durations:  subliminal (30 msec), short (230 msec), and 
long (1000 msec) in combination with the investment task used in the previous two 
studies.  Individual differences in affect were assessed with commonly used self-report 
measures of state and trait measures of affect in addition to two mood implicit association 
tests (IAT) using emotional words and faces.   
The current study extends previous research on individual differences in affect 
and their association with decision making in several important ways.  First, this study 
investigates both state and dispositional measures of affect in contrast to previous studies, 





of general positive and negative affect in addition to individual difference measures of 
specific emotions, specifically anxiety and depression, in order to more firmly establish 
whether links between specific negative emotions and risk-avoidant behavior are due 
simply to the presence of negative affect rather than the specific emotion.  In addition to 
explicit measures of affect, the current study also includes implicit measures of affect, 
which have been shown to have stronger effects on judgments and behaviors (Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993; Rotteveel et al., 2001) and neural activation (Critchley et al., 2000; Hall, 
Gonzalez, Sripada, & Schultheiss, in preparation; Whalen et al., 1998) than more 
conscious measures.  In summary, the current study investigates how individual 
differences in state and trait affect, measured both explicitly and implicitly, influence 
complex investment decisions involving risk and seeks to replicate our previous findings 
implicating the influence of facial expressions of emotion on financial risk-taking. 
Based on past literature and findings from the previous two dissertation studies, 
we predict that happy facial expressions will lead to increases in financial risk-taking and 
that angry facial expressions will lead to decreases in financial risk-taking across all 
stimulus duration conditions.  Fearful facial expressions will also reduce financial risk-
taking for subliminal and short stimulus durations.  We also predict that implicit 
measures of affect will be more strongly associated with financial risk-taking on our 
investment task compared to traditional, self-report measures.  Participants assessed as 
high in positive affect through implicit measures will be more likely to pick risky stock 
options whereas participants assessed as high in negative affect will be more likely to 







Participants:   
One hundred forty-seven undergraduate students were recruited from the 
Introduction to Psychology subject pool at the University of Michigan. These participants 
included 69 men and 78 women between the ages of 18-23 (101 Caucasian, 5 African 
American, 22 Asian American, 7 Hispanic, 12 Other).  Participants provided informed 
consent in compliance with the Institutional Review Board guidelines of the University of 
Michigan.  They received course credit for their participation.   
Procedure:   
Explicit measures of affect.  Participants completed several commonly used 
explicit, self-report measures of current mood prior to the investment task.  These 
measures included the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS:  Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988), the Mood Adjective Checklist (MAC), and the State scale of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI:  Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970).  The 
PANAS consists of 10 positive affect words (e.g., interested, excited) and 10 negative 
affect words (e.g., distressed, upset) where participants must rate how strongly they felt 
these emotions during the past 2 weeks, including today.   For the MAC, participants 
must rate how strongly they felt a list of 8 positive (e.g., happy, joyful) and 8 negative 
moods (e.g., hopeless, depressed) during the past 2 weeks, including today.  The STAI 
consists of 40 items, which measure the temporary condition of state anxiety (e.g., “I feel 
tense”) and the more general and chronic trait anxiety (e.g., “I am a steady person”). 
Participants also completed self-report trait measures of affect after the 





Steer, 1988), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI:  Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961), and the Trait scale of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et 
al., 1970).  The BAI consists of 21 items describing common symptoms of anxiety (e.g., 
“numbness or tingling,” “feeling hot”).  The BDI is a commonly used 21-item scale 
measuring characteristic symptoms and attitudes of depression (“I am so sad or unhappy 
that I can‟t stand it,” “I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse”). 
Implicit measures of affect.  Participants also completed two versions of a mood 
implicit association test (Mood IAT:  Hall, 2006).  The Mood IAT was adapted from the 
original implicit association test (IAT:  Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998) to assess 
nonconscious moods of negative and positive valence.  During the word version of the 
Mood IAT, participants were asked to sort words as quickly as possible into the 
following categories for 5 trials:  Me vs. Others, Good vs. Bad, Me or Good vs. Others or 
Bad, Others vs. Me, Others or Good vs. Me or Bad.  Me words include “I,” “my,” 
“myself,” and “mine,” and Other words include “they,” “them,” “their,” and “theirs.”  
The Good category words consist of positively valenced emotion words from the Mood 
Adjective Checklist:  “happy,” “joyful,” “glad,” “pleased,” “satisfied,” “contented,” 
“cheerful,” and “hopeful.”  The Bad category words consist of negatively valenced 
emotion words from the Mood Adjective Checklist: “unhappy,” “joyless,” “sad,” 
“displeased,” “dissatisfied,” “sorry,” “depressed,” and “hopeless.”   
Participants also completed a faces version of the Mood IAT, in which they sorted 
8 positively and 8 negatively valenced faces from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set 
(Tottenham et al., 2002) into Me vs. Others and Good vs. Bad categories with the idea 





Me or Good / Others or Bad pairings than Me or Bad / Others or Good pairings whereas 
those high in negative affect would be faster at classifying words and faces into Me or 
Bad / Others or Good pairings versus Me or Good / Others or Bad pairings.  Both 
versions of the IAT were scored by obtaining a difference score in the response times 
between matched and mismatched classifications.  Thus, greater difference scores would 
represent higher levels of negative affect.  
Experimental task.  Participants completed a practice version of the experimental 
task before the actual task began in order to learn the instructions and structure of the 
investment task.   Participants completed affective priming trials in each of the 3 stimulus 
durations presented in counterbalanced order.  Each participant completed 12 trials of 
each of the 4 affective prime conditions (fearful face, angry face, neutral face, happy 
face) under each of the 3 stimulus duration conditions (subliminal, short, long) in 
counterbalanced order for a total of 144 trials.  Subliminal affective priming trials 
consisted of a 30 msec affective prime followed by a 200 msec scrambled face mask, 
which was immediately followed by a 1000 msec investment task.  Short affective 
priming trials consisted of a 230 msec affective prime immediately followed by a 1000 
msec investment task.  Long affective priming trials consisted of a 1000 msec affective 
prime immediately followed by a 1000 msec investment task.  
Face stimuli.  We used color photographs of the faces of 12 individuals (6 men, 6 
women) selected from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2002).  We used 






Investment task.  After each affective prime, participants completed a modified 
version of the Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy task (BIAS:  Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005), a dynamic investment task designed to elicit a range of investment 
behaviors that requires the participant to decide among two risky, high-payoff stocks and 
a safe, low-payoff bond.  We decreased the monetary outcomes of the stock choices and 
increased the monetary outcome of the bond choice in the BIAS task from the original 
study in order to avoid a floor effect of the bond choice as suggested by preliminary data 
collection.    
Similar to the original study, our modified BIAS task consists of 5 stages, each 
lasting 200 ms (See Figure 2.1).  During the first stage, the participant is presented with 
the two stocks and bond on the screen („Pre-Choice‟).  During the second stage, the 
participant decides which investment option they will choose when the word “Choose” 
appears („Choice‟).  Then participants wait for a brief period („Wait‟) and their current 
earnings for that trial are displayed („Outcome‟).  In the final stage, the outcomes of all 
the choices are then displayed („Market‟) followed by a 200 msec fixation cross. 
Without the participants‟ knowledge, one of the two stocks was randomly 
assigned to be the “good” stock while the other stock was assigned to be the “bad” stock 
at the beginning of each affective priming block.  For the good stock, participants win $5 
with 50% probability, lose $5 with 25% probability, and no change with 25% probability.  
For the bad stock, participants lose $5 with 50% probability, win $5 with 25% 
probability, and no change with 25% probability.  The bond pays $3 with 100% 





Participants were told the probabilities of the good stock, the bad stock, and the 
bond before the actual experiment, but they were not told which stock was assigned to be 
good and which stock was assigned to be bad at the beginning of each block or that the 
good stock and the bad stock changed after every block.  They were instructed that the 
goal of the task was to figure out which one of the two stocks was the good stock 
throughout the task so that they could win as much money as possible.  Participants were 
also told that the experiment was divided into 3 sections of about 10 minutes each.   
Data analysis:   
 Percentages of safe bond and risky stock choices were calculated for the 4 
affective priming conditions (fearful face, angry face, neutral face, happy face) during 
each of the 3 stimulus duration conditions (subliminal, short, long).  Statistical tests were 
conducted with ANOVA and t tests.  Correlations were computed between our individual 
difference measures of affect and percentage of safe bond choices by risk across trials 
and by affective prime and stimulus duration conditions. 
Results 
We first calculated the percentage of safe bond choices as a function of the 
preceding affective prime (fearful face, angry face, neutral face, happy face) and the 
length of the affective prime presentation (subliminal, short, long).  A 4 × 3 within 
subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for affect, F(3, 438) = 5.61, p < .001, 
and for stimulus duration, F(2, 292) = 24.90, p < .001.  The affective prime × stimulus 
duration interaction was also significant, F(6, 876) = 3.14, p < .005.   
Participants were not more likely to make more safe bond choices after 





Participants made fewer safe bond choices after happy faces relative to neutral faces 
presented at both short [t(146) = -3.71, p < .001] and long [t(146) = -3.28, p = .001]  
stimulus durations.  Contrary to predictions, participants were not more likely to make 
safe bond choices after fearful faces relative to neutral faces in short or long stimulus 
durations.  Participants also did not make more safe bond choices after angry faces 
relative to neutral faces regardless of stimulus duration condition.  The percentage of safe 
bond choices as a function of affective priming condition is displayed in Figure 4.1.   
Mean scores for each of the individual difference measures of affect divided by 
gender is shown in Table 4.1.  There were no differences between males and females for 
any of the individual difference measures.  To investigate how individual differences in 
affect are associated with financial risk-taking, we computed correlations between our 
implicit (Mood IAT - Words, Mood IAT - Faces) and explicit (PANAS, MAC, STAI, 
BAI, BDI) measures of affect and percentages of safe bond choices.  Correlations 
between our affective measures and safe bond choices are displayed in Figure 4.2.  Safe 
bond choices were positively and significantly correlated with our implicit measures of 
affect.  The Mood IAT - Words version was positively correlated (r = .23, p < .01) with 
safe bond choices and the Mood IAT - Faces version was positively correlated (r = .29, p 
< .01) with safe bond choices.  No significant correlations were found between safe bond 
choices and our explicit measures of affect.  We also computed correlations between our 
individual difference measures of affect and safe bond choices by affective prime and 
stimulus duration conditions.  These correlations are displayed in Table 4.2.  As shown, 
none of the explicit measures of affect were significantly correlated with safe bond 





significant between our implicit measures of affect and safe bond choices across all 
affective priming and stimulus duration conditions.  Correlations ranged from 0.17-0.26 
for our Mood IAT - Words measure and from 0.22-0.33 for our Mood IAT - Faces 
measure across affective priming conditions.  Correlations ranged from 0.19-0.24 for our 
Mood IAT - Words measure and from 0.20-0.30 for our Mood IAT - Faces measure 
across stimulus duration conditions. 
Discussion 
The current study replicates findings found in Study 1 that happy facial 
expressions of emotion lead to increased financial risk-taking in an investment task.  
Furthermore, this study provides evidence for a link between individual differences in 
negative affect and risk-avoidant decisions.  Higher scores on our two Mood IAT 
measures, reflecting higher levels of negative affect, were positively correlated with more 
safe bond choices.  On the other hand, no correlations were found between scores on 
explicit measures of affect and safe bond choices.   
Our findings linking implicit levels of negative affect and safe bond choices is 
consistent with prior research, which found associations between experimentally 
manipulated and dispositional measures of fear and pessimistic, risk-avoidant choices 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  It is unclear from our findings whether this observed link is 
due specifically to anxiety or merely negative affect since our Mood IAT measures were 
not designed to assess specific emotions.  It is also important to consider whether the link 
between negative affect and safe bond choices is due to transient or more chronic levels 





they may also be measuring more chronic levels of negative affect.  Disentangling these 
processes are potential avenues for future research.   
The current findings may also have clinical implications for understanding 
decision making processes in clinical disorders characterized by negative affect, such as 
anxiety and depression.  For example, individuals with anxiety disorders may exhibit 
more risk-avoidant behaviors because anxiety signals threat and promotes responses to 
avoid that threat.  Alternatively, anxious individuals may make more risk-avoidant 
decisions because their anxiety promotes pessimistic appraisals of future outcomes, 
which play an important role in shaping decisions. 
One explanation for the lack of overlap found between self-report measures of 
affect and financial risk-taking is that individuals may be less capable of rating their own 
affect.  This theory is consistent with research indicating that individuals in general have 
limited insight into their own motives (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  Our findings are also 
consistent with previous research indicating stronger affective effects under less 
conscious than fully conscious conditions (Critchley et al., 2000; Murphy & Zajonc, 
1993; Rotteveel et al., 2001; Whalen et al., 1998).  
While our findings indicate that implicit measures of affect are more strongly 
associated with risk-avoidant choices whereas explicit measures show no relationship, 
others have found associations between decisions involving risk and explicit measures of 
affect (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Maner et al., 2007).  Discrepancies in research findings 
suggest that the presence or absence of affective effects may depend critically on how 
affect is measured as well as the specific type of responses (e.g., neural activation, 





study.  Our findings suggest that there may be two modes of processing by which 
affective processes influence decisions:  a system whereby affect influences decisions 
through conscious and more controlled processes and another system in which affect 
influences decisions through unconscious and more automatic processes.  The conscious 
affective system may be more amenable to investigation through the use of mood 
induction methods or explicit measures of affect.  On the other hand, the unconscious 
affective system may be best investigated using implicit measures of affect and implicitly 
processed affective cues, such as facial expressions of emotion.   
This idea is consistent with the theory of two motivational systems proposed by 
McClelland and colleagues (1989).  The explicit motivational system represents 
motivational dispositions that individuals can verbally report, which guide controlled 
forms of behavior.  By contrast, the implicit motivational system represents motivations 
that occur outside of conscious awareness, which guide automatic and spontaneous forms 
of behavior.  Schultheiss (2008) provides compelling evidence that explicit and implicit 
motivational systems do not overlap, respond to different types of stimuli, and predict 
different types of behaviors.  According to the information-processing model of motives 
(Schultheiss, 2001), implicit motives are more likely to respond to nonverbal cues and to 
have an impact on declarative measures of motivation, such as physiological responses, 
neural activation, and instrumental learning.  By contrast, explicit motives respond 
preferentially to verbal cues and are more likely to have an influence on declarative 
measures of motivation, such as attitudes and judgments.   Similarly, our Mood IAT 
measures may have been assessing an implicit affective system, which predicted risk-





implicit systems are more responsive to nonverbal cues in that correlations between 
implicit mood and risk-avoidant investment choices were somewhat higher when 
assessing implicit mood using pictures of facial expressions of emotion compared to 
verbal cues consisting of positively and negatively valenced emotion words. 
There is also a growing body of evidence for separate brain systems for goal-
directed, conscious motivational processes that drive behavior in response to incentives 
and are mediated predominantly by subcortical brain structures and for automatic, 
nonconscious motivational processes involved in the explicit regulation of behavior, 
which are mediated by cortical structures (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; LeDoux, 2002).  
Studies already indicate that implicit and explicit systems involved in emotional 
processing and motivation compete with and suppress each other (e.g., Ochsner, Bunge, 
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Lieberman et al, 2007) and that individual differences in 
implicit motives for power and affiliation influence activation in motivational brain 
structures in response to facial expressions of emotion (Hall, Stanton, & Schultheiss, 
2010; Schultheiss et al., 2008).  Future neuroimaging research may further our 
understanding of how individual differences in implicit and explicit affect influence 
activation in these two brain systems, which may highlight the ways that these two 
processes operate independently and with each other.  
In conclusion, our findings demonstrate a link between individual differences in 
negative affect and risk-avoidant choices.  Implicit measures of individual differences in 
affect were more strongly correlated with financial decisions on an investment task.  
These findings highlight the potential benefit of adding implicit measures to more 





decision making.  They also suggest that there may be two modes of processing by which 
affect influences financial decisions:  an explicit, conscious affective system which may 
best be investigated through mood induction methods and self-report measures of affect 
and an implicit, unconscious affective system which may best be studied through implicit 
measures of affect, such as implicitly processed facial expressions and implicit 
association tests, which tap into unconscious moods that individuals may not be willing 











































    Gender     
Males   Females                                              
Measure  
Mood IAT - Words   237.18  282.90 
Mood IAT - Faces  164.05   134.64 
PANAS - Positive           33.53     32.99  
PANAS - Negative              19.74     21.34 
MAC - Positive              27.25     27.97 
MAC - Negative    14.78     14.70 
STAI - State     36.03     37.29 
STAI - Trait     38.37     41.05 
BAI                 9.97     13.05 















Condition      
Fear        Anger       Neutral    Happy      Uncon       Con        Long                                              
Measure  
Mood IAT - Words 0.17*      0.26**      0.19*       0.23**      0.24**      0.19*      0.19*        
Mood IAT - Faces 0.22**    0.26**      0.33**     0.27**      0.30**      0.20*      0.28** 
PANAS - P            -0.08       -0.02        -0.01        -0.04         -0.13        -0.03        0.02 
PANAS - N            -0.10       -0.08       -0.08         -0.11        -0.09        -0.05       -0.12 
MAC - P            -0.05        0.02          0.01        -0.02        -0.04        -0.03         0.03 
MAC - N  0.06        0.06          0.08         0.02          0.03          0.12        0.02 
STAI - S  0.03        0.07          0.05         0.06          0.06          0.09        0.01 
STAI - T  0.03        0.00          0.01         0.02          0.06          0.05       -0.05 
BAI             -0.04       -0.05        -0.03        -0.04        -0.04         -0.03       -0.04 
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Research on decision making in the last few decades has begun to address the 
powerful role of affect in what was once an exclusively cognitive field.  Several classic 
studies have demonstrated that positive affect leads to optimistic risk estimates whereas 
negative affect promotes pessimistic risk estimates (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Wright & 
Bower, 1992).  More recent research has also established how specific emotions 
influence risk estimates and choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  Neuroimaging studies 
have also highlighted the important role of positive and negative anticipatory affect and 
their neural markers in financial risk-taking (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).  While this 
research has furthered our understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms by 
which affect influences decisions, many of these studies have used only one approach to 
investigate affective influences (e.g., valence-based or emotion-specific approaches, 
conscious or unconscious affective primes, explicit or implicit measures of affect, trait or 
state measures of affect). 
The three studies in this dissertation fill this gap by using multiple methods (e.g., 
fMRI, behavioral measures, implicit association tests, individual difference measures) 
and approaches (e.g., valence-based and emotion-specific approaches, affective primes 





state measures of affect) to compare and contrast the different ways that affect influences 
decisions depending on how it is measured.  Across all three studies is the conclusion that 
affect plays an important role in complex financial decisions involving risk and that there 
may be at least two modes of processing by which affective influences can shape 
decisions.  Several speculations about these two systems can be made from our findings.  
The first is an automatic, unconscious affective system that exerts valence-based effects 
on decisions, responds preferentially to implicit measures (e.g., IAT) and implicitly 
processed affective cues (e.g., facial expressions of emotion), and primarily involves 
subcortical brain regions, particularly the nucleus accumbens and amygdala.  The second 
is a conscious affect system that exerts emotion-specific effects on decisions through 
more controlled cognitive processes (e.g., appraisal), responds preferentially to explicit 
measures (e.g., traditional self-report scales) and longer-lasting mood induction methods, 
and primarily involves more cortical brain structures.  The potential existence of two 
modes of processing highlights the importance of paying careful attention to how affect is 
measured and including multiple methods and approaches that would allow an 
investigation of how both modes influence decision making.   
The three studies presented in this dissertation illustrate how affect can shape 
financial decisions using a diverse set of methods and approaches.  The first study used 
fMRI in combination with subliminal and supraliminal affective primes to investigate 
how affect influences financial risk-taking and activity in neural markers associated with 
anticipatory arousal, the nucleus accumbens and insula.  Our findings demonstrate that 
happy affective primes lead to increases in financial risk-taking and activation in the 





conscious affective primes.  Next, we reviewed existing research demonstrating that 
subliminally presented facial expressions of emotion can influence judgments, decisions, 
and behaviors even without eliciting changes in subjective feelings.  Study 2 extended 
these effects to more complex financial investment decisions, and demonstrated that 
facial expressions of emotion can have a range of effects depending on how long they are 
presented, from a general valence effect for facial expressions presented at short stimulus 
durations to differentiated emotion-specific effects for facial expressions presented at 
long stimulus durations.  Lastly, Study 3 demonstrated that individual differences in 
affect when measured implicitly were more strongly associated with financial risk-taking 
than explicit measures of affect.  Given that other studies have found associations 
between explicit measures of affect and judgments, our findings suggest that there may 
be at least two modes of processing involved in risky decisions.  Thus, the inclusion of 
both implicit and explicit measures of affect in research studies may provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the interplay between cognitive and affective processes 
in decision making.   
These three dissertation studies demonstrate that facial expressions of emotion, 
even when presented very briefly, can influence financial risk-taking and activity in 
neural markers of anticipatory arousal (i.e., nucleus accumbens, insula), a finding that is 
particularly important given the abundance of facial expressions in our everyday lives.  In 
addition, these influences do not seem to require conscious awareness or a change in 
subjective feelings.  These findings suggest several possible underlying psychological 
and neural mechanisms by which affect influences financial decision making.  One 





taking is through changes in the systems governing approach or avoidance behaviors.  
For example, happy faces could signal a favorable environment and activate the positive 
affect system whereas fearful faces could signal an unfavorable environment and activate 
the negative affect system.  Thus, happy faces could promote exploration whereas fearful 
faces could promote caution.  An alternative explanation is that facial expressions could 
result in changes in the perception of the value or riskiness of an option.  For example, 
happy faces could make risky stock choices seem more valuable or less risky.  Both 
explanations are consistent with findings from Study 1 that happy faces increase the 
propensity to choose risky stocks. 
 In terms of a potential neural explanation, facial expressions may influence 
financial risk-taking by activating subcortical structures, such as the amygdala or the 
nucleus accumbens, and their connections to the prefrontal cortex, which is involved in 
the representation of value (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).  The amygdala shows activation 
to subliminally presented fearful faces even without explicit knowledge that they were 
presented (Whalen et al., 1998).  Furthermore, it projects to the nucleus accumbens, a 
neural marker of positive anticipatory arousal, which showed greater activation to 
unconsciously presented happy faces relative to consciously presented happy faces in 
Study 1. 
Neuroscience research indicates that basic affective reactions are mediated largely 
by subcortical structures that evolved early, including the amygdala, nucleus accumbens, 
hypothalamus, and lower brain stem. These reactions are fast and automatic and do not 
require consciousness in contrast to cortical systems that evolved later, which are 





may be two neural circuits by which unconsciously and consciously presented facial 
expressions of emotion influence decision making.  Unconscious facial expressions of 
emotion may exert a general valence-based effect on decision making through a relatively 
direct and automatic pathway involving subcortical brain regions.  This process may 
occur independently from cortical structures that underlie conscious affective reactions 
and does not involve a change in subjective feelings or higher-order cognitive processes. 
On the other hand, facial expressions of emotion presented for longer stimulus durations 
show emotion-specific effects on decision making.  For example, implicitly presented 
fearful and angry faces both decreased financial risk-taking in Study 2, but when they 
were presented for longer durations, only fearful faces decreased financial risk-taking.  
This process may involve an interaction of subcortical (e.g., amygdala, nucleus 
accumbens) and cortical structures (e.g., prefrontal cortex) and may also involve 
conscious feelings and higher-order cognitive processes, such as appraisal.       
 While emotions have traditionally been viewed as inherently conscious, the 
empirical evidence discussed in this dissertation suggests that emotions can also be 
unconscious and that unconscious affective influences play an important role in decision 
making.  Subliminal presentations of facial expressions of emotion lead to changes in 
judgments, decisions, and behaviors as well as physiological and neural responses even 
when they are not consciously perceived or associated with changes in subjective 
feelings.  Neuroscience research supports the existence of two neural pathways involving 
cortical and subcortical regions that may be involved in conscious and unconscious 





processes, unconscious affective reactions are likely mediated largely by early-evolved 
subcortical regions. 
While the evidence presented in this dissertation provides clues to the 
psychological and neural mechanisms involved in affect and decision making, there are 
several limitations and important questions that should be addressed in future research.  
Our findings from Study 1 show that happy faces lead to increases in financial risk-taking 
and nucleus accumbens activation.  However, since we used only one type of positive 
affective prime, it is not clear whether increases in financial risk-taking were due to the 
happy faces specifically or merely general positive affect.  In addition, Study 1 did not 
find changes in financial risk-taking following angry faces.  It would be useful to include 
fearful faces, which did decrease financial risk-taking in Study 1, and other negative 
facial expressions in future neuroimaging research in order to more accurately assess 
their influence on risk-taking and neural markers of negative anticipatory arousal.  
There are a number of other potentially informative avenues for future research.  
For example, it would be useful to see whether the influence of facial expressions 
depends on whether they change subjective feelings.  The current study exclusively used 
subliminal and supraliminal facial expressions of emotion to investigate affective 
influences on decision making.  In future research, it would be useful to see whether 
other manipulations of affect (e.g., mood induction methods) or other types of affective 
cues (e.g., IAPS pictures) would exert the same influence on financial risk-taking.  In 
addition, the use of clinical populations may allow a better way to understand the link 
between affect and financial risk-taking given that the range of affect is relatively limited 





investigate whether cognitive processes, such as appraisal, mediate the effects of affect 
on decision making.  Lastly, it would be valuable to conduct an fMRI study to investigate 
predictions about the psychological and neural processes involved in the two affect 
systems that were proposed in this dissertation. 
While investigating conscious processes and subjective feelings of emotion such 
as those assessed by self-report measures are certainly an important component of 
understanding the role of affect in decision making, this research should be 
complemented with research that explores both conscious and unconscious affective 
influences using multiple methods and approaches.  The studies presented in this 
dissertation along with past research further our understanding about the basic 
psychological and neural mechanisms by which affect influences decision making and 
provide support for a dual-process model of risky decisions.  Knowledge about these 
mechanisms and an understanding of the importance of investigating affect using 
unconscious, implicit measures will aid in the design of future research studies, which 
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